Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors: Actual Risk versus User Perception by Mehrnezhad, Maryam et al.
This is an author produced version of Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors: Actual Risk 
versus User Perception.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/119505/
Article:
Mehrnezhad, Maryam, Toreini, Ehsan, Shahandashti, Siamak F. 
orcid.org/0000-0002-5284-6847 et al. (1 more author) (2017) Stealing PINs via Mobile 
Sensors: Actual Risk versus User Perception. International Journal of Information Security.
pp. 1-23. ISSN 1615-5262 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-017-0369-x
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Int. J. Inf. Secur.
DOI 10.1007/s10207-017-0369-x
REGULAR CONTRIBUTION
Stealing PINs via mobile sensors: actual risk versus user
perception
Maryam Mehrnezhad1 · Ehsan Toreini1 · Siamak F. Shahandashti1 · Feng Hao1
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract In this paper, we present the actual risks of steal-
ing user PINs by using mobile sensors versus the perceived
risks by users. First, we propose PINlogger.js which is a
JavaScript-based side channel attack revealing user PINs on
an Android mobile phone. In this attack, once the user vis-
its a website controlled by an attacker, the JavaScript code
embedded in the web page starts listening to the motion and
orientation sensor streams without needing any permission
from the user. By analysing these streams, it infers the user’s
PIN using an artificial neural network. Based on a test set of
fifty 4-digit PINs, PINlogger.js is able to correctly identify
PINs in the first attempt with a success rate of 74% which
increases to 86 and 94% in the second and third attempts,
respectively. The high success rates of stealing user PINs on
mobile devices via JavaScript indicate a serious threat to user
security. With the technical understanding of the informa-
tion leakage caused by mobile phone sensors, we then study
users’ perception of the risks associated with these sensors.
We design user studies to measure the general familiarity with
different sensors and their functionality, and to investigate
how concerned users are about their PIN being discovered
by an app that has access to all these sensors. Our studies
show that there is significant disparity between the actual and
perceived levels of threat with regard to the compromise of
the user PIN. We confirm our results by interviewing our par-
ticipants using two different approaches, within-subject and
between-subject, and compare the results. We discuss how
this observation, along with other factors, renders many aca-
demic and industry solutions ineffective in preventing such
side channel attacks.
B Maryam Mehrnezhad
m.mehrnezhad@ncl.ac.uk
1 School of Computing Science, Newcastle University,
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Keywords Mobile sensors · JavaScript attack · Mobile
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1 Introduction
Smartphones equipped with many different sensors such as
GPS, light, orientation, and motion are continuously pro-
viding more features to end users in order to interact with
their real-world surroundings. Developers can have access
to the mobile sensors either by (1) writing native code using
mobile OS APIs [1], (2) recompiling HTML5 code into a
native app [2], or (3) using standard APIs provided by the
W3C which are accessible through JavaScript code within a
mobile browser.1 The last method has the advantage of not
needing any app-store approval for releasing the app or doing
future updates. More importantly, the JavaScript code is plat-
form independent, i.e., once the code is developed it can be
executed within any modern browser on any mobile OS.
In-browser access risks While sensor-enabled mobile
web applications provide users more functionalities, they
raise new privacy and security concerns. Both the academic
community and the industry have recognized such issues
regarding certain sensors such as geolocation [3]. For a web-
site to access the geolocation data, it must ask for explicit user
permission. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
little work evaluating the risks of in-browser access to other
sensors. Unlike in-app attacks, an in-browser attack, i.e., via
JavaScript code embedded in a web page, does not require
any app installation. In addition, JavaScript code does not
require any user permission to access sensor data such as
device motion and orientation. Furthermore, there is no noti-
1 http://w3.org/TR/#tr_Javascript_APIs.
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Fig. 1 PINlogger.js potential attack scenarios; a the malicious code is
loaded in an iframe and the user is on the same tab, b the attack tab
is already open and the user is on a different tab, c the attack content
is already open in a minimized browser, and the user is on an installed
app, d the attack content is already open in a (minimized) browser, and
the screen is locked. The attacker listens to the side channel motion
and orientation measurements of the victim’s mobile device through
JavaScript code, and uses machine learning methods to discover the
user’s sensitive information such as activity types and PINs
fication while JavaScript is reading the sensor data stream.
Hence, such in-browser attacks can be carried out far more
covertly than the in-app counterparts.
However, an effective in-browser attack still has to over-
come the technical challenge that the sampling rates available
in browser are much lower than those in app. For example, as
we observed in [4], frequency rates of motion and orientation
sensor data available in-browser are 3 to 5 times lower than
those of accelerometer and gyroscope available in-app.
In-browser attacks Many popular browsers such as Safari,
Chrome, Firefox, Opera, and Dolphin have already imple-
mented access to the above sensor data. As we demonstrated
in [5] and [4], all of these mobile browsers allow such access
when the code is placed in any part of the active tab including
iframes (Fig. 1a). In some cases such as Chrome and Dolphin
on iOS, an inactive tab can have access to the sensor measure-
ments as well (Fig. 1b). Even worse, some browsers such as
Safari allow the inactive tabs to access the sensor data, when
the browser is minimized (Fig. 1c), or even when the screen
is locked (Fig. 1d).
Through experiments, we find that mobile operating sys-
tems and browsers do not implement consistent access
control policies in regard to mobile orientation and motion
sensor data. Partly, this is because W3C specifications [6]
do not specify any policy and do not discuss any risks asso-
ciated with this potential vulnerability. Also, because of the
low sampling rates available in browser, the community have
been neglecting the security risks associated with in-browser
access to such sensor data. However, in TouchSignatures [4],
we showed that despite the low sampling rates, it is possible
to identify user touch actions such as click, scroll, and zoom
and even the numpad’s digits. In this paper, we introduce
PINLogger.js, an attack on full 4-digit PINs as opposed to
only single digits in [4].
Mobile sensors Today, sensors are everywhere: from your
personalized devices such as mobiles, tablets, watches, fit-
ness trackers, and other wearables, to your TV, car, kitchen,
home, and to the roads, parking lots, and smart cities. These
new technologies are equipped with many different sensors
such as NFC, accelerometer, orientation, and motion and are
connected to each other. These sensors are continuously pro-
viding more features to end users in order to interact with
their real-world surroundings. While the users are benefiting
from richer and more personalized apps which are using these
sensors for different applications such as fitness, gaming, and
even security application such as authentication, the growing
number of sensors introduces new security and privacy risks
to end users, and makes the task of sensor management more
complex.
Research questions While sensors on mobile platforms
are getting more powerful and starting to collect more infor-
mation about the users and their environment, we want to
evaluate the general knowledge about these sensors among
the mobile users. We are particularly interested to know the
level of concern people may have about these sensors being
able to threaten their privacy and security.
Contributions In this work, we contribute to the study of
sensors and their actual risks and their perceived risks by
users as follows:
• We introduce PINLogger.js, an attack on full 4-digit PINs
as opposed to only single digits in [4]. We show that
unregulated access to these sensors imposes more serious
security risks to the users in comparison with more well-
known sensors such as camera, light, and microphone.
• We conduct user studies to investigate users’ understand-
ing about these sensors and also their perception of the
security risks associated with them. We show that users
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in fact have fewer security concerns about these sensors
comparing to more well-known ones.
• We study and challenge current suggested solutions, and
discuss why our studies show they cannot be effective.
We argue that a usable and secure solution is not straight-
forward and requires further research.
2 User activities
The potential threats to the user security posed by an unau-
thorized access to the motion and orientation sensor data
are not immediately clear. Here we demonstrate two simple
scenarios which show that sensitive user information such
as phone calls timing and physical activities can be deduced
from device orientation and motion sensor data obtained from
JavaScript.
Users tend to move their mobile devices in distinctive
manners while performing certain tasks on the devices, or
by simply carrying them. Examples of the former include
answering a call or taking a photograph, while the latter
covers their transport mode. In both cases, an identifiable
succession of movements is exhibited by the device. As a
result, a web-based program which has access to the device
orientation and motion data may reveal sensitive facts about
users such as the exact timing information of the start and
end of phone calls and that of taking photographs. On the
other hand, while the user is simply carrying her device, the
device movement pattern may reveal information about the
user’s transport mode, e.g. if the user is stationary at one
place, walking, running, on the bus, in a car or on the train.
We present the results of two initial experiments that we have
performed on a Nexus 5 using Maxthon Browser (as an exam-
ple of a browser that allows JavaScript to access sensor data
even when the screen is locked).
Motion and orientation sensors detail Before, presenting
the results, we first explain the motion and orientation sensors
in detail. According to W3C specifications [6], motion and
orientation sensor data are a series of different measurements
as follows:
• device orientation which provides the physical orienta-
tion of the device, expressed as three rotation angles (α,
β, γ ) in the device’s local coordinate frame,
• device acceleration which provides the physical accel-
eration of the device, expressed in Cartesian coordinates
(x , y, z) in the device’s local coordinate frame,
• device acceleration including gravity which is similar to
acceleration except that it includes gravity as well,
• device rotation rate which provides the rotation rate of
the device about the local coordinate frame, expressed as
three rotation angles (α, β, γ ), and
• interval which provides the constant sampling rate and
is expressed in milliseconds (ms).
The device coordinate frame is defined with respect to the
standard position of the mobile screen. When it is in the por-
trait mode, x and y axes are in the plane of the screen and are
positive towards the screen’s right and up, and z is perpendic-
ular to the plane of the screen and is positive outwards from
the screen. Moreover, the sensor data discussed above are
processed sensor data obtained from multiple physical sen-
sors such as gyroscope and accelerometer. In the rest of this
paper, unless specified otherwise, by sensor data we mean
the sensor data accessible through mobile browsers which
include acceleration, acceleration including gravity, rotation
rate, and orientation.
Phone call timing In the first experiment, we opened the
website carrying our JavaScript code and then locked the
screen. The JavaScript code continued to log orientation and
motion data while the Android phone was left on a desk. For
this experiment, we used another phone to call the Android
phone four times with a few seconds apart between the
calls. As demonstrated in Fig. 2 (left), the 4 distinct phone
calls along with their timing are recognizable from the three
dimensions of acceleration (including gravity) which come
from the device motion sensor. For a better comparison, Fig. 2
(right) shows the received call history of the phone during the
experiment with their start times and durations. As shown in
this figure, the captured sensor data match the call history.
User physical activities In the second experiment, we
again locked the phone and recorded the sensor data dur-
ing 22 s of sitting, 34 s of walking and 25 s of slow running.
We observed that the mentioned activities have visibly dis-
tinctive sensor streams. As an example, Fig. 3 shows the
acceleration data from motion sensor. As it can be seen, the
mentioned activities are recognizable from each other since
they are visibly different in the sensor measurements.
Our initial evaluations suggest that discovering device
movement related information such as call times and user’s
mode of transport can be easily implemented. However, as
we will explain, distinguishing user PINs is a lot harder as the
induced sensor measurements are only subtly different. In the
following sections, we will demonstrate that, with advanced
machine learning techniques, we are able to remotely infer
the entered PINs on a mobile phone with high accuracy.
3 PINlogger.js
In this section, we describe an advanced attack on user’s PINs
by introducing PINlogger.js. In the following subsections, we
describe the attack approach, our program implementation,
data collection, feature extraction, and neural network.
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Fig. 2 Left Three dimensions (x, y, and z) of acceleration data including gravity (from the motion sensor). The start time, duration, and end time
of four phone calls are easily recognizable from these measurements. Right The screenshot of the call history of the phone during the experiment
Fig. 3 Three dimensions (x, y, and z) of acceleration data (from the
motion sensor) during 22 s of sitting, 34 s of walking and 25 s of running
3.1 Attack approach
We consider an attacker who wants to learn the user’s PIN
tapped on a soft keyboard of a smartphone via side channel
information. We consider (digit-only) PINs since they are
popular credentials used by users for many purposes such as
unlocking phone, SIM PIN, NFC payments, bank cards, other
banking services, gaming, and other personalized applica-
tions such as health care and insurance. Unlike similar works
which have to gain the access through an installed app [7–16],
our attack does not require any user permission. Instead, we
assume that the user has loaded the malicious web content in
the form of an iframe, or another tab while working with the
mobile browser as shown in Fig. 1. At this point, the attack
code has already started listening to the sensor sequences
from the user’s interaction with the phone.
In order to uncover when the user enters his PIN, we need
to classify his touch actions such as click, scroll, and zoom.
We have already shown in TouchSignatures [4] that with the
same sensor data and by applying classification algorithms, it
is possible to effectively identify user’s touch actions. Here,
we consider a scenario after the touch action classification.
In other words, our attacker already knows that the user is
entering his PIN. Moreover, unless explicitly noted, we con-
sider a generic attack scenario which is not user dependant.
This means that we do not need to train our machine learn-
ing algorithm with the same user as the subject of the attack.
Instead, we have a one-round training phase with data from
multiple voluntary users and use the obtained trained algo-
rithm to output other users’ PINs later. This approach has the
benefit of not needing to trick individual users to collect their
data for training.
3.2 Web program implementation
We implemented a web page with embedded JavaScript code
in order to collect the data from voluntary users. Our code
registers two listeners on the window object to have access
to orientation and motion data separately. The event handlers
defined for these purposes are named DeviceOrientation-
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Fig. 4 Different input methods used by the users for PIN entrance
Event and DeviceMotionEvent, respectively. On the client
side, we developed a GUI in HTML5 which shows random
4-digit PINs to the users and activates a numpad for them
to enter the PINs as shown in Fig. 4. All sensor sequences
are sent to the database along with their associated labels
which are the digits of the entered PINs. We implemented our
server program using Node.js (nodejs.org). Our code sends
the orientation and motion sensor data of the mobile device
to our NoSQL database using MongoLab (mongolab.com,
web-based service for MongoDB). When the event listener
fires, it establishes a socket by using Socket.IO (socket.io)
between the client and the server and constantly transmits the
sensor data to the database. Both Node.js and MongoDB (as
a document-oriented database) are known for being capable
of supporting data intensive applications in real time.
In the proof-of-concept implementation of the attack, we
focus on working with active web pages, which allows us
to easily identify the start of a touch action through the
JavaScript access to the onkeydown event. A similar approach
is adopted in other works, e.g. TouchLogger [8] and TapLog-
ger [16]. In an extended attack scenario, a more complex
segmentation process would be needed to identify the start
and end of a touch action. This could be achieved by mea-
suring the peak amplitudes of a signal, as done in [12].
3.3 Data collection
Following the approach of Aviv et al. [7] and Spreitzer [15],
we consider a set of 50 fixed PINs with uniformly distributed
digits. We created these PINs in a way that all digits are
repeated about the same time (around 20 times). The data
collection code is publicly available via GitHub. Technical
details of the data collection process and the collected data
are publicly available too.2
We conducted our user studies using Chrome on an
Android device (Nexus 5). The experiments and results are
based on the collected data from 10 users, each entering all
the 50 4-digit PINs for 5 times. Our voluntary participants
2 http://github.com/maryammjd/Reading-sensor-data-for-fifty-4digit
-PINs.
were university students and staff and performed the experi-
ments at university offices. We simply explained to them that
all they needed was to enter a few PINs shown in a web page.
In relation to the environmental setting for the data col-
lection, we asked the users to remain sitting in a chair while
working with the phone. We did not require our users to hold
the phone in any particular mode (portrait or landscape) or
work with it by using any specific input method (using one
or two hands). We let them choose their most comfortable
posture for holding the phone and working with it as they do
in their usual manner. While watching the users during the
experiments, we noticed that all of our users used the phone
in the portrait mode by default. Users were either leaning
their hands on the desk or freely keeping them in the air. We
also observed the following input methods used by the users.
• Holding the phone in one hand and entering the PIN with
the thumb of the same hand (Fig. 4 left).
• Holding the phone in one hand and entering the PIN with
the fingers of the other hand (Fig. 4 centre).
• Holding the phone with two hands and entering the PIN
with the thumbs or fingers of both hands (Fig. 4 right).
In the first two cases, users exchangeably used either their
right hands or left hands in order to hold the phone. In order
to simulate a real-world data collection environment, we took
the phone to each user’s workspace and briefly explained the
experiment to them, and let them complete the experiment
without our supervision. All users found this way of data
collection very easy and could finish the experiments without
any difficulties. Our participants were given each an Amazon
voucher (worth £10) at the end for their participation.
3.4 Feature extraction
In order to build the feature vector as the input to our classifier
algorithm, we consider both time-domain and frequency-
domain features. We improve our suggested feature vectors in
[4] by adding some more complex features such as the corre-
lation between the measurements. This addition improves the
results, as we will discuss in Sect. 4. As discussed before, 12
different sequences obtained from the collected data include
orientation (ori), acceleration (acc), acceleration including
gravity (accG), and rotation rate (rotR) with three sequences
(either x , y and z, or α, β and γ ) for each sensor measure-
ment. As a pre-processing step and in order to remove the
effect of the initial position and orientation of the device, we
subtract the initial value in each sequence from subsequent
values in the sequence.
We use these pre-processed sequences for feature extrac-
tion in time domain directly. In frequency domain, we
apply the fast Fourier transform (FFT) on the pre-processed
sequences and use the transformed sequences for feature
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extraction. In order to build our feature vector, first we
obtain the maximum, minimum, and average values of each
pre-processed and FFT sequences. These statistical measure-
ments give us 3 × 12 = 36 features in the time domain and
the same number of features in the frequency domain. We
also consider the total energy of each sequence in both time
and frequency domains calculated as the sum of the squared
sequence values, i.e., E =
∑
v2i which gives us 24 new
features.
The next set of features are in time domain and are based
on the correlation between each pair of sequences in different
axes. We have 4 different sequences; ori, acc, accG, and rotR,
each represented by 3 measurements. Hence, we can calcu-
late 6 different correlation values between the possible pairs;
(ori, acc), (ori, accG), (ori, rotR), (acc, accG), (acc, rotR),
and (accG, rotR), each presented in a vector with 3 elements.
We use the Correlation coefficient function in order to calcu-
late the similarity rate between the mentioned sequences. The
correlation coefficient method is commonly used to compare
the similarity of the shapes of two signals (e.g. [17]). Given
two sequences A and B and Cov(A, B) denoting covariance
between A and B, the correlation coefficient is computed as
below:
RAB =
Cov(A, B)√
Cov(A, A) · Cov(B, B)
(1)
The correlation coefficient of two vectors measures their
linear dependence by using covariance. By adding these new
18 features, our feature vector consists of a total of 114 fea-
tures.
3.5 Neural network
We apply a supervised machine learning algorithm by using
an artificial neural network (ANN) to solve this classification
problem. The input of an ANN system could be either raw
data, or pre-processed data from the samples. In our case, we
have pre-processed our samples by building a feature vector
as described before. Therefore, as input, our ANN receives a
set of 114 features for each sample. As explained before, we
collected 5 samples per each 4-digit PIN from 10 users. While
reading the records, we realized that some of the PINs have
been entered wrongly by some users. This was expected since
each user was required to enter 250 PINs. Since we recorded
both expected and entered PINs in our data collection, we
could easily identify these PINs and exclude them from our
analysis. Overall, out of 2500 records collected from 10 users,
12 of the PINs were entered wrongly. Hence we ended up
with 2488 samples for our ANN.
The feature vectors are mapped to specific labels from a
finite set: i.e., 50 fixed random 4-digit PINs. We train and val-
idate our algorithm with two different subsets of our collected
Table 1 PINlogger.js’s PIN identification rates in different attempts
Attempts Multiple-users (%) Same-user (%)
One 74 79
Two 86 93
Three 94 97
data, and test the neural network against a separate subset of
the data. We train the network with 70% of our data, validate it
with 15% of the records, and test it with the remaining 15% of
our data set. We use a pattern recognition/classifying network
in MATLAB with one hidden layer and 1000 nodes. Pat-
tern recognition/classifying networks normally use a scaled
conjugate gradient (SCG) back-propagation algorithm for
updating weight and bias values in training. Scaled conju-
gate gradient is a fast supervised learning algorithm [18].
4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of our attack on 4-digit
PINs in two different forms: multi-users mode and same-
user mode. We also train separate ANN systems to learn
individual digits of PINs and compare these results with other
works.
4.1 Multiple-users mode
The second column of Table 1 shows the accuracy of our
ANN trained with the data from all users. In this mode, the
results are based on training, validating, and testing our ANN
using the collected data from all of our 10 participants. As the
table shows, in the first attempt PINlogger.js is able to infer
the user’s 4-digit PIN correctly with accuracy of 74.43%, and
as expected it gets better in further attempts. By comparison,
a random attack can guess a PIN from a set of 50 PINs with
the probability of 2% in the first attempt and 6% in three
attempts.
4.2 Same-user mode
In order to study the impact of individual training, we trained,
validated, and tested the network with the data collected from
one user. We refer to this mode of analysis as the same-user
mode. We asked our user to enter 50 random PINs, each five
times, and repeated the experiment for 10 times (rounds).
The reason we have repeated the experiments is that the clas-
sifier needs to receive enough samples to be able to train
the system. Interestingly, our user used all three different
input methods shown in Fig. 4 during the PIN entrance. As
expected, our classifier performs better when it is personal-
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Table 2 Average digit identification rates in different attempts
Attempts Multiple-users (%) Same-user (%)
One 70 79
Two 83 90
Three 92 96
ized: the accuracy reaches 79.23% in the first attempt and
increases to 93.52 and 97.71% in two and three attempts,
respectively.
In the same-user mode, convincing the users to provide
the attacker with sufficient data for training customized clas-
sifiers is not easy, but still possible. Approaches similar to
gaming apps such as Math Trainer3 could be applied. Math-
based CAPTCHAs are possible web-based alternatives. Any
other web-based game application which segments the GUI
similar to a numerical keypad will do as well. Nonetheless,
in this paper we mainly follow the multiple-users approach.
4.3 Identification of PIN digits
One might argue that the attack should be evaluated against
the whole 4-digit PIN space. However, we believe that the
attack could still be practical when selecting from a limited
set of PINs since users do not select their PINs randomly [19].
It has been reported that around 27% of all possible 4-digit
PINs belong to a set of 20 PINs,4 including straightfor-
ward ones like “1111”, “1234”, or “2000”. Nevertheless, we
present the results of our analysis of the attack against the
entire search space for the two experiment modes discussed
above. We considered 10 classes of the entered digits (0–9)
from the data we collected on 4-digit PINs used in Sect. 4.1.
In the multiple-users mode, we trained, validated, and
tested our system with data from all 10 users. In the same-
user mode, we trained personalized classifiers for each user.
Unlike the test condition of Sect. 4.2, we did not have to
increase the number of rounds of PIN entry here since we
had enough samples for each digit per user. In the same-user
mode in this section, we used the average of the results of our
10 users. The average identification rates of different digits
for three different approaches are presented in Table 2.
The results in our multiple-users mode indicate that we
can infer the digits with a success probability of 70.75, 83.27,
and 94.03% in the first, second, and third attempts, respec-
tively. This means that for a 4-digit PIN and based on the
obtained sensor data, the attacker can guess the PIN from a
set of 34 = 81 possible PINs with a probability of success
of 0.92064 = 71.82%. A random attack, however, can only
3 http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.solirify.
mathgame.
4 http://datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/.
predict the 4-digit PIN with the probability of 0.81% in 81
attempts. By comparison, PINlogger.js achieves a dramati-
cally higher success rate than a random attacker.
Using a similar argument, in the same-user mode the suc-
cess probability of guessing the PIN in 81 attempts is 85.46%.
In the same setting, Cai and Chen report a success rate of 65%
using accelerometer and gyroscope data [20] and Simon and
Anderson’s [14] PIN Skimmer only achieves a 12% success
rate in 81 attempts using camera and microphone. Our results
in digit recognition in this paper are also better than what is
achieved in TouchSignatures [4]. In summary, PINlogger.js
performs better than all sensor-based digit-identifier attacks
in the literature.
4.4 Comparison with related work
Obtaining sensitive information about users such as PINs
based on mobile sensors has been actively explored by
researchers in the field [21,22]. In particular, there is a
number of research which uses mobile sensors through a
malicious app running in the background to extract PINs
entered on the soft keyboard of the mobile device. For exam-
ple, GyroPhone, by Michalevsky et al. [10], shows that
gyroscope data are sufficient to identify the speaker and even
parse speech to some extent. Other examples include Acces-
sory [13] by Owusu et al. and Tapprints by Miluzzo et al. [11].
They infer passwords on full alphabetical soft keyboards
based on accelerometer measurements. Touchlogger [8] is
another example by Cai and Chen [20] which shows the pos-
sibility of distinguishing user’s input on a mobile numpad
by using accelerometer and gyroscope. The same authors
demonstrate a similar attack in [9] on both numerical and
full keyboards. The only work which relies on in-browser
access to sensors to attack a numpad is our previous work,
TouchSignatures [4]. All of these works, however, aim for
the individual digits or characters of a keyboard, rather than
the entire PIN or password.
Another category of works directly targets user PINs. For
example, PIN skimmer by Simon and Anderson [14] is an
attack on a user’s numpad and PINs using the camera and
microphone on the smartphone. Spreitzer suggests another
PIN Skimming attack [15] and steals a user’s PIN based
on the measurements from the smartphone’s ambient light
sensor. Narain et al. introduce another attack [12] on smart-
phone numerical and alphabetical keyboards and the user’s
PINs and credit card numbers by using the smartphone micro-
phone. TapLogger by Xu et al. [16] is another attack on the
smartphone numpad which outputs the pressed digits and
PINs based on accelerometer and orientation sensor data.
Similarly, Aviv et al. introduce an accelerometer-based side
channel attack on the user’s PINs and patterns in [7]. We
choose to compare PINlogger.js with the works in this cat-
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Table 3 Comparison of PINlogger.js with related attacks on 4-digit PINs
Features work Sensor Access Training Identification rate
1st try (%) 2nd try (%) 5th try (%)
PIN Skimming [15] Light In-app Same-user NA 50 65
PIN Skimmer [14] Cam, Mic In-app Same-user NA 30 50
Keylogging by Mic [12] Mic, Gyr In-app Same-user 94 NA NA
TapLogger [16] Acc, Ori In-app Same-user 40 75 100
Acc side channel [7] Acc In-app Same-user 18 NA 43
PINlogger.js Motion, Ori In-browser Multiple-users 74 86 98
Same-user 79 93 99
egory since they have the same goal of revealing the user’s
PINs. Table 3 presents the results of our comparison.
As shown in Table 3, PINlogger.js is the only attack on
PINs which acquires the sensor data via JavaScript code.
In-browser JavaScript-based attacks impose even more secu-
rity threats to users since unlike in-app attacks, they do not
require any app installation and user permission to work.
Moreover, the attacker does not need to develop different
apps for different platforms such as Android, iOS, and Win-
dows. Once the attacker develops the JavaScript code, it can
be deployed to attack all mobile devices regardless of the
platform. Moreover, Touchlogger.js is the only works which
present the results of the attack for multiple-users modes. By
contrast, the results from other works are mainly based on
training the classifiers for individual users. In other words,
they assume the attacker is able to collect input training data
from the victim user before launching the PIN attack. We do
not have such an assumption as the training data are obtained
from all users in the experiment. In terms of accuracy, with the
exception of [12], PINlogger.js generally outperforms other
works with an identification rate of 74% in the first attempt.
This is a significant success rate (despite that the sampling
rate in-browser is much lower than that available in-app) and
confirms that the described attack imposes a serious threat to
the users’ security and privacy.
5 Why does this vulnerability exist?
Although reports of side channel attacks based on the in-
browser access to mobile sensors via JavaScript are relatively
recent, similar attacks via in-app access to mobile sensors
have been known for years. Yet the problem has not been
fixed. Here, we discuss the reasons why such a vulnerability
has remained unfixed for a long time.
5.1 Unmanaged sensors
In an attempt to explain multiple sensor-related in-app vul-
nerabilities, Xu et al. [16] argue that “the fundamental
problem is that sensing is unmanaged on existing smartphone
platforms”. There are multiple in-app side-channel attacks
that support this argument, as we discussed in the previous
section. Our work shows that the problem of in-app access to
“unmanaged sensors” is now spreading to in-browser access.
Here we present the “unmanaged” motion and orientation
sensor case which shows how the technical mismanagement
of these sensors causes serious user privacy consequences
when it comes to unregulated access to such sensors via
JavaScript.
W3C vs. Android According to W3C specifications [6],
the motion and orientation sensor streams are not raw sen-
sor data, but rather high-level data which are agnostic to the
underlying source of information. Common sources of infor-
mation include gyroscopes, compasses, and accelerometers.
In Tables 4 and 5, we present raw (low-level) and synthesized
(high-level) motion sensors supported by Android [1] along
with their descriptions and units, as well as their correspond-
ing W3C definitions [6].
As it can be seen from the tables, different terminologies
have been used for describing the same measurements in-
app and in-browser. For example, while in-app access uses
the raw sensor terminology, i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope,
magnetic field, the in-browser access uses synthesized sen-
sor terminology, i.e., motion and orientation [6]. This creates
confusion for users (as we will explain later) and developers
(as we experienced it ourselves). One of the W3C’s spec-
ifications on mobile sensors, “Generic Sensor API” [23],
dedicates a few sections to the issue of naming sensors, and
low-level and high-level sensors. It discusses how the termi-
nology for in-browser access has been high-level so far. It also
mentions that the low-level use cases are increasingly popular
among the developers. As stated in this specification: “The
distinction between high-level and low-level sensor types is
somewhat arbitrary and the line between the two is often
blurred”. And “Because the distinction is somewhat blurry,
extensions to this specification are encouraged to provide
domain-specific definitions of high-level and low-level sen-
sors for the given sensor types they are targeting”. We believe
that due to the rapid increase in mobile sensors, it is necessary
to come up with a consistent approach.
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Table 4 Motion sensors supported by Android and their corresponding W3C definitions
Android motion sensors Description Unit W3C def.
Accelerometer Acceleration force along 3 axes m/s2 Acceleration with gravity
Gravity Force of gravity along 3 axes m/s2 NA
Gyroscope Rate of rotation around 3 axes rad/s Rotation rate
Uncalibrated gyroscope Rate of rotation (no drift compensation), and rad/s NA
Estimated drift around 3 axes rad/s NA
Linear accelerometer Acceleration force excluding gravity along 3 axes m/s2 Acceleration
Rotation vector Rotation vector component along 3 axes Unitless NA
Step counter Number of user’s steps since last reboot Steps NA
Table 5 Position sensors supported by Android and their corresponding W3C definitions
Android position sensors Description Unit W3C def.
Game rotation vector Rotation vector component along 3 axes Unitless NA
Geomagnetic rotation vector Rotation vector component along 3 axes Unitless NA
Geomagnetic magnetic field Geomagnetic field strength along 3 axes µT NA
Uncalibrated magnetic field Geomagnetic field strength (no hard iron calibration) µT NA
And iron bias estimation along 3 axes µT NA
Orientation Angles around 3 axes Degrees Orientation
Proximity Distance from object cm NA
Orientation sensor was deprecated in Android 2.2 (API Level 8)
5.2 Unknown sensors
We believe another contributing factor is that users seem to
be less familiar with the relatively newer (and less adver-
tised) sensors such as motion and orientation, as opposed
to their immediate familiarity with well-established sensors
such as camera and GPS. For example, a user has asked this
question on a mobile forum: “. . . What benefits do having
a gyroscope, accelerometer, proximity sensor, digital com-
pass, and barometer offer the user? I understand it has to do
with the phone orientation but am unclear in their benefits.
Any explanation would be great! Thanks!”.5
We design and conduct user studies in this work in order
to investigate to what extent are these sensors and their risks
known to the users.
List of mobile sensors We prepared a list of different
mobile sensors by inspecting the official websites of the latest
iOS and Android products, and the specifications that W3C
and Android provide for developers. We also added some
extra sensors as common sensing mobile hardware which
are not covered before.
5 http://forums.androidcentral.com/verizon-galaxy-nexus/
171482-barometer-accelerometer-how-they-useful.html.
• iPhone 66: Touch ID, Barometer, Three-axis gyro, Accel-
erometer, Proximity sensor, Ambient light sensor.
• Nexus 6P7: Fingerprint sensor, Accelerometer, Gyro-
scope, Barometer, Proximity sensor, Ambient light sen-
sor, Hall sensor, Android Sensor hub.
• Android [1]: Accelerometer, Ambient temperature, Grav-
ity (software or hardware), Gyroscope, Light, Linear
Acceleration (software or hardware), Magnetic Field,
Orientation (software), Pressure, Proximity, Relative
humidity, Rotation vector (software or hardware), Tem-
perature.
• W3C8 [6]: Device orientation (software), Device motion
(software), Ambient light, Proximity, Ambient tempera-
ture, Humidity, Atmospheric Pressure.
• Extra sensors (common sensing hardware): Wireless
technologies (WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC), Camera, Micro-
phone, Touch screen, GPS.
Unless specified otherwise, all the listed sensors are hard-
ware sensors. We added the last category of the sensors
to this list since they indeed sense the device’s surround-
ing although in different ways. However, they are neither
6 http://apple.com/uk/iphone-6/specs/.
7 http://store.google.com/product/nexus_6p.
8 http://w3.org/2009/dap/.
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counted as sensors in mobile product descriptions, nor in
technical specifications. These sensors are often categorized
as OS resources [24], and hence, different security policies
apply to them.
5.3 User study
In this section, we aimed to observe the amount of knowledge
that mobile users have about mobile sensors. We prepared a
list of sensors based on what we explained above and asked
volunteer participants to rate the level of their familiarity with
each sensor. All of our experiments and user studies were
approved by Newcastle University’s ethical committee.
5.3.1 Participants
We recruited 60 participants to take part in this study via
different means including mailing lists, social network-
ing, vocational networks, and distributing flyers in different
places such as different schools in the university, colleges,
local shops, churches, and mosques. A sample of our call for
participation and participants’ demographics are available in
“Appendix 1”.
Among our participants, 28 self-identified themselves as
male and 32 as female, from 18 to 67 years old, with a median
age of 33.85. None of the participants were studying or work-
ing in the field of mobile sensor security. Our university
participants were from multiple degree programs and levels,
and the remaining participants worked in a different range
of fields. Moreover, our participants owned a wide range of
mobile devices and had been using a smartphone/tablet for
5.6 years on average. Our participants were from different
countries, and all could speak English. We interviewed our
participants at a university office and gave each an Amazon
voucher (worth £10) at the end for their participation. Details
of the interview template can be found in “Appendix 2”.
5.3.2 Study approach
For a list of 25 different sensors, we used a five-point scale
self-rated familiarity questionnaire as used in [25]: “I’ve
never heard of this”, “I’ve heard of this, but I don’t know
what this is”, “I know what this is, but I don’t know how this
works”, “I know generally how this works”, and “I know
very well how this works”. The list of sensors was randomly
ordered for each user to minimize bias. In addition, we needed
to observe the experiments to make sure users were answer-
ing the questions based on their own knowledge in order to
avoid the effect of processed answers. Full descriptions of all
studies are provided in “Appendix 2”.
5.3.3 Findings
Figure 5 summarizes the results of this study. This figure
shows the level of self-declared knowledge about different
mobile sensors. The question was: “To what extent do you
know each sensor on a mobile device?”. Sensors are ordered
based on the aggregate percentage of participants declaring
they know generally or very well how each sensor works.
This aggregate percentage is shown on the right-hand side.
In the case of equal aggregate percentage, the sensor with a
bigger share on being known very well by the participants
is shown earlier. Our participants were generally surprised
to hear about some sensors and impressed by the variety.
As one may expect, newer sensors tend to be less known
to the users in comparison with older ones. In particular,
our participants were generally not familiar with ambient
sensors. Although some of our participants knew the ambient
sensors in other contexts (e.g. thermostats used at home), they
could not recognize them in the context of a mobile device.
Low-level hardware sensors such as accelerometer and
gyroscope seem to be less known to the users in comparison
with high-level software ones such as motion, orientation,
and rotation. We suspect that this is partly due to the fact that
the high-level sensors are named after their functionalities
and can be more immediately related to user activities.
We also noticed that a few of the participants knew some of
the low-level sensors by name but they could not link them
to their functionality. For example, one of our participants
who knew almost all of the listed sensors (except hall sensor
and sensor hub) stated that: “When I want to buy a mobile
[phone], I do a lot of search, that is why I have heard of all
of these sensors. But, I know that I do not use them (like
accelerometer and gyroscope)”.
On the other hand, as the functionalities of mobile devices
grow, vendors quite naturally turn to promote the software
capabilities of their products, instead of introducing the hard-
ware. For example, many mobile devices are recognized for
their gesture recognition features by the users; however, the
same users might not know how these devices provide such a
feature. For instance, one of the participants commented on
a feature on her smartphone called “Smart Stay”9 as follows:
“I have another sensor on my phone: Smart Stay. I know how
it works, but I don’t know which sensors it uses”.
6 User studies on risk perception of mobile sensors
In this section, we study the participants’ risk perception of
mobile sensors. There have been several studies on risk per-
ception addressing different aspects of mobile technology.
9 http://samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS00035658/234302/
SCH-R950TSAUSC.
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Fig. 5 Level of self-declared knowledge about different mobile sensors
Some works discuss the risks that users perceive on smart-
phone authentication methods such as PINs and patterns [26],
TouchID and Android face unlock [27], and implicit authen-
tication [28]. Other works focus on the privacy risks of certain
sensors such as GPS [29]. Raji et al. [30] show users’ con-
cerns (on disclosure of selected behaviours and contexts)
about a specific sensor-enabled device called AutoSense10.
To the best of our knowledge, the research presented in this
paper is the first that studies the user risk perception for a
10 http://sites.google.com/site/autosenseproject/.
comprehensive list of mobile sensors (25 in total). We limit
our study to the level of perceived risks users associate with
their PINs being discovered by each sensor. The reasons we
chose PINs are that first, finding one’s PIN is a clear and
intuitive security risk, and second, we can put the perceived
risk levels in context with respect to the actual risk levels for
a number of sensors as described in Table 3.
6.1 Methodology
For this study, we divide our 60 participants into two groups
and studied the two group separately using two differ-
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ent approaches: within-subject and between-subject. In the
within-subject study, we interviewed 30 participants for all
parts of the study. In contrast, in the between-subject study,
we interviewed a new group of 30 participants, and we later
compared the results with the previous group. By these two
approaches, we aim to measure differences (after informing
users on descriptions of sensors) within a participant and
between participants, respectively.
6.1.1 Within-subject study
In this approach, we asked 30 participants to rate the level
of risk they perceive for each sensor in regard to revealing
their PINs in two phases. In phase one, we gave the same
sensor list (randomized for each user). We described a spe-
cific scenario in which a game app which has access to all
these sensors is open in the background and the user is work-
ing on his online banking app, entering a PIN. We used a
self-rated questionnaire with five-point scale answers follow-
ing the same terminology as used in [30]: “Not concerned”,
“A little concerned”, “Moderately concerned”, “Concerned”,
and “Extremely concerned”. During this phase, we asked the
users to rely on the information that they already had about
each sensor (see “Appendix 2” for details).
In the second phase, first we provided the participants with
a short description of each sensor and let them know that
they can ask further questions until they feel confident that
they understand the functionality of all sensors. Participants
could use a dictionary on their device to look at the words
that were less familiar to them. Afterwards, we asked the
participants to fill in another copy of the same questionnaire
on risk perceptions (details in “Appendix 2”). Participants
could keep the sensor description paper during this phase to
refer to it in the case they forgot the description of certain
sensors.
6.1.2 Between-subject study
In this study, first we gave the description of the sensors to our
second group of 30 participants, and similar to previous study,
we gave them enough time to familiarize themselves with the
sensors and to ask as many questions as they wanted until they
felt confident about each sensor. Then, we presented the par-
ticipants with the questionnaire on risk perceptions (details
in “Appendix 2”). Similar to our previous study, participants
could keep the sensor description paper while filling in this
questionnaire.
6.2 Intuitive risk perception
The results of our within-subject study are presented in Fig. 6.
These results present the users’ perceived risk for different
mobile sensors for the same group of users before (top bars)
and after (bottom bars) being presented with descriptions of
sensors. The results of our between-subject study are pre-
sented in Fig. 7. Note that this figure represents the risk
perception of group one of our participants before know-
ing the sensors descriptions, and group two of participants
after knowing the sensors descriptions. For both figures, the
question was: “To what extent are you concerned about each
sensor’s risk to your PIN?”, sensors are ordered based on the
aggregate percentage of participants declaring they are either
concerned or extremely concerned about each sensor before
seeing the descriptions. This aggregate percentage is the first
value presented on the right-hand side. In the case of equal
aggregate percentage, the sensor with a bigger share on being
perceived extremely concerned by the participants is shown
earlier.
We make the following observations from the results of
the experiment.
Touch Screen Although our participants rated touch screen
as one of the most risky sensors in relation to a PIN discovery
scenario, still about half of our participants were either mod-
erately concerned, a little concerned, or not concerned at all.
Through our conversations with the users, we received some
interesting comments, e.g. “Why any of these sensors should
be dangerous on an app while I have officially installed it
from a legal place such as Google Play?”, and “As long as
the app with these sensors is in the background, I have no
concern at all”. It seems that a more general risk model in
relation to mobile devices is affecting the users’ perception
in regard to the presented PIN discovery threat. This fact can
be a topic of research on its own and is out of the scope of
this paper.
Communicational Sensors One category of the sensors
which users are relatively more concerned about includes
WiFi, Bluetooth, and NFC. For example, one of the partici-
pants commented that: “I am not concerned with physical
[motion, orientation, accelerometer, etc.]/ environmental
[light, pressure, etc.] sensors, but network ones. Hackers
might be able to transfer my information and PIN”. These
sensors appearing more risky to the users are understandable
since we asked them to what extent they were concerned
about each sensor in regard to the PIN discovery.
Identity-Related Sensors Another category which has been
rated more risky than others contains those sensors which can
capture something related to the user’s identity, i.e. finger-
print, TouchID, GPS, camera, and microphone. Despite that
we described a PIN-related scenario, our participants were
still concerned about these sensors. This was also pointed out
by a few participants through the comments. For example,
a user stated: “. . ., however, GPS might reveal the location
along with the user input PIN that has a risk to reveal who (and
where) that PIN belongs to. Also the fingerprint/TouchID
might recognize and record the biometrics with the user’s
PIN”. Some of these sensors such as GPS, fingerprint, and
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Fig. 6 Users’ perceived risk for different mobile sensors for within-subject approach
TouchID, however, cannot cause the disclosure of PINs on
their own. Hence, the concern does not entirely match the
actual risk. Similar to the discussion on touch screen, we
believe that a more general risk model on mobile technology
influences the users to perceive risk on specific threats such
as the one we presented to them.
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Fig. 7 Users’ perceived risk for different mobile sensors for between-subject approach
Environmental Sensors The level of concern on ambi-
ent sensors (humidity, light, pressure, and temperature) is
generally low and stays low after the users are provided
with the description of the sensors (see Fig. 6). In many
cases, our users expressed that they were concerned about
these sensors simply because they did not know them: “[now
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that I know these sensors,] I am quite certain that move-
ment/environmental sensors would not affect the security
of personal id/passwords, etc.”. In fact, researchers have
reported that it is possible to infer the user’s PIN using
the ambient light sensor data [15], although, to our knowl-
edge, exploits of other environmental sensors have not been
reported in the literature.
Movement Sensors On the sensors related to the movement
and the position of the phone (accelerometer, gyroscope,
motion, orientation, and rotation), the users display varying
levels of the risk perceptions. In some cases, they are slightly
more concerned, but in others they are less concerned once
they know the functionality. Some of our users stated that
since they did not know these sensors, they were not con-
cerned at all, but others were more concerned when they
were faced with new sensors. Overall, knowing or not know-
ing these sensors has not affected the perceived risk level
significantly, and they were rated generally low in both cases.
Motion and Orientation Sensors The sensors which we
used in our attack, namely orientation, rotation, and motion,
have not been generally scored high for their risk in reveal-
ing PINs. Users do not seem to be able to relate the risk of
these sensors to the disclosure of their PINs, despite that they
seem to have an average general understanding about how
they work. On hardware sensors such as accelerometer and
gyroscope, the risk perception seems to be even lower. A few
comments include: “In my everyday life, I don’t even think
about these [movement] sensors and their security. There
is nothing on the news about their risk”, and “I have never
been thinking about these [movement] sensors and I have not
heard about their risk”. On the other hand, some of the par-
ticipants expressed more concerns for sensors that they were
familiar with, as one wrote, “You always hear about privacy
stuff for example on Facebook when you put your location
or pictures”. Similarly, it seems that having a previous risk
model is a factor that might explain the correlation between
the user’s knowledge and their perceived risk.
7 Discussions
7.1 General knowledge versus risk perception
Figures 5 and 6 suggest that there may be a correlation
between the relative level of knowledge users have about sen-
sors and the relative level of risk they perceive from them.
We confirm our observation of correlation using Spearman’s
rank-order correlation measure. As shown in Table 6, we
present the Spearman’s correlation between the comparative
knowledge and the perceived risk about different sensors for
different participants’ data set: group one before being pre-
sented with the sensor descriptions, group one after sensor
description, group two after sensor descriptions, and finally
Table 6 Spearman’s correlation between the comparative knowledge
and the perceived risk about different sensors
Participants’ data set Status Spearman’s correlation
Group 1 Before sensor desc. 0.61
Group 1 After sensor desc. 0.61
Group 2 After sensor desc. 0.48
Groups 1 and 2 After sensor desc. 0.58
groups one and two after being presented with the sensor
descriptions.
For each participants’ data set, the sensors are separately
ranked based on the level that the users are familiar with
them, similar to Fig. 5. Accordingly, the levels of concern
are ranked too. The Spearman’s correlation equation has been
applied on these ranks for each group separately.
For example, the Spearman’s correlation between the
comparative knowledge (median: “I know what this is, but
I don’t know how this works”, IQR11: “I’ve never heard of
this”–“I know very well how this works”) and the perceived
risk about different sensors for group one (median: “Not con-
cerned”, IQR: “Not concerned”–“A little concerned”) before
knowing the sensor descriptions is r = 0.61 (p < 0.05).
As it can be seen, these results support that the more
the users know about these sensors, the more concern they
express about the risk of the sensors revealing PINs. We
acknowledge that other methods of ranking the results, e.g.
using median, produce slightly different final rankings. How-
ever, given the high confidence level of the above test, we
expect the correlation to be supported if other methods of
ranking are used.
Assuming that customer demand drives better security
designs, the above correlation may explain why sensors that
are newer to the market have not been considered as OS
resources and consequently have not been subject to similar
strict access control policies.
7.2 Perceived risk versus the actual risk
We are specifically interested in the users’ relative risk per-
ception of sensors in revealing their PINs in comparison with
the actual relative risk level of these sensors. We list the
results reported in the literature in Table 3 for the follow-
ing sensors: light, camera, microphone, gyroscope, motion,
and orientation. Figure 6 shows that users generally have
expressed more concern about sensors such as camera and
microphone than accelerometer, gyroscope, orientation, and
motion. This does not match the actual risk levels since the
latter sensors allow PIN recovery with higher accuracy as
we have shown in Sect. 4. When asked after filling the ques-
11 Interquartile range.
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tionnaire, most participants could not come up with realistic
attack scenarios using camera and microphone. For micro-
phone, some users thought they might say the PIN out loud.
For camera, a few of our participants thought face recognition
might be used to recover the PIN; hence, they rated camera’s
risk to their PINs high. One user thought the camera might
capture the reflection of the entered PIN in her glasses.
Among our participants, one mentioned but described
doubt about motion, orientation, accelerometer, and gyro-
scope being able to record the shakes of the mobile phone
while entering a PIN after they saw the sensor descriptions:
“I feel those positional sensors might be able to reveal some-
thing about my activities, for example if I open my banking
app or enter my PIN. But it is extremely hard for different
users, and when working with different hands and positions”.
This participant expressed only “a little concern” about them,
stating that: “. . ., and by little concern, I mean extremely lit-
tle concern”. One of our participants was completely familiar
with these attacks and in fact had read some related papers.
This user was “extremely concerned”. Other users who rated
these sensors risky in general said they were generally con-
cerned about different sensors. One commented: “I can not
think of any particular situation in which these sensors can
steal my PIN, but the hackers can do everything these days”.
7.3 Possible solutions
In this section, we discuss the current academic and industrial
countermeasures to mitigate sensor-based attacks.
7.3.1 Academic approach
Different solutions to address the in-app access attacks have
been suggested in the literature, e.g. restricting the sensor
to one app, reducing the sampling rate, temporal pause of
the sensor on sensitive entries such as keyboard, rearranging
keyboard for password entrance, asking for explicit permis-
sion from the user, ranking apps based on their similarities
to malware, and obfuscating anomalies in sensor data [7,10–
16,31,32]. However, after many years of research on showing
the serious security risks of sensors such as accelerometer and
gyroscope, none of the major mobile platforms have revised
their in-app access policy.
We believe that the risks of unmanaged sensors on mobile
phones, specially through JavaScript code, are not known
very well yet. More specifically, many OS-/app-level solu-
tions such as asking for permissions at the installation time or
malware detection approaches would not work in the context
of a web attack. In our previous work [4], we suggested to
apply the same security policies as those for camera, micro-
phone, and GPS for the motion and orientation sensors. Our
suggestion was to set a multi-layer access control system on
the OS and browser levels. However, the usability and effec-
tiveness of this solution are arguable. First, asking too many
permissions from the user for different sensors might not be
usable. Furthermore, for some basic use cases such as gesture
recognition to clear a web form, or adjusting the screen from
portrait to landscape, it might not make sense to ask for user
permission for every website. Second, with the increase in
the number of sensors accessible through mobile browsers,
this approach might not be effective due to the classic prob-
lem of sidestepping the security procedure by users when it
is too much of a burden [33]. As stated by one of our par-
ticipants: “I don’t mind these sensors being risky anyway. I
don’t even review the permission list. I have no other choice
to be able to use the app”. Moreover, as we have shown in
Sect. 5, users generally do not understand the implications of
these sensors on discovering their PINs, for example, even
though they know how these sensors work. Hence, such an
approach might not be effective in practice.
7.3.2 Industrial approach
W3C Device Orientation Event Specification. There is
no Security and Privacy section in the latest official W3C
Working Draft Document on Device Orientation Event [6].
However, at the time of writing this paper, a new version
of the W3C specification is being drafted, which includes a
new section on security and privacy issues related to mobile
sensors,12 as suggested by us in [4]. The authors working
on the revision of the W3C specification point out the prob-
lem of fingerprinting mobile devices [31], and touch action
recovery [4] through these sensors, and suggest the following
mitigations:
• “Do not fire events when the page where they were reg-
istered on is not visible or has been backgrounded.”
• “Fire events only on the top-level browsing context or
same-origin nested iframes.”
• “Limit the frequency of events (typically 60 Hz seems to
be sufficient).”
We believe that these measures may be too restrictive in
blocking useful functionalities. For example, imagine a user
consciously running a web program in the browser to monitor
his daily physical activities such as walking and running. This
program needs to continue to have access to the motion and
orientation sensor data when the user is working on another
tab or minimizes the browser. One might argue that such a
program should be available as an app instead; hence, the use
case is not valid. However, it is expected that the boundary
between installed apps and embedded JavaScript programs
in the browser will gradually diminish [34].
12 http://w3c.github.io/deviceorientation/spec-source-orientation.
html.
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Mobile browsers As we showed in [4], browsers and
mobile operating systems behave differently on providing
access to sensors. Some allow access only on the active web-
page and any embedded iframes (although with different
origins), some allow access to other tabs, when browser is
minimized, or even when the phone is locked. Hence, there
is not a consistent approach across all browsers and mobile
platforms. Reducing the frequency rate has been applied to
all well-known browsers at the moment [4]. For instance,
Chrome reduced the sensor readings from 200 to 60 Hz due
to security concerns.13 However, our attack shows that secu-
rity risks are still present even at lower frequencies. iOS and
Android limit the maximum frequency rate of some sensors
such as Gyroscope to 100 and 200 Hz, respectively. It is
expected that these frequencies will increase on mobile OSs
in the near future and in-browser access is no exception. In
fact, current mobile gyroscopes support much higher sam-
pling frequencies, e.g. up to 800 Hz by STMicroelectronics
(on Apple products) and up to 8000 Hz by InvenSense (on
the Google Nexus range) [10]. With higher frequencies avail-
able, attacks such as ours can perform better in the future if
adequate security countermeasures are not applied.
Following our report of the issue to Mozilla, starting
from version 46 (released in April 2016), Firefox restricts
JavaScript access to motion and orientation sensors to only
top-level documents and same-origin iframes.14 In the lat-
est Apple Security Updates for iOS 9.3 (released in March
2016), Safari took a similar countermeasure by “suspending
the availability of this [motion and orientation] data when the
web view is hidden”.15 However, we believe the implemented
countermeasures should only serve as a temporary fix rather
than the ultimate solution. In particular, we are concerned
that it has the drawback of prohibiting potentially useful web
applications in the future. For example, a web page running a
fitness program has a legitimate reason to access the motion
sensors even when the web page view is hidden. However,
this is no longer possible in the new versions of Firefox and
Safari. Our concern is confirmed by members in the Google
Chromium team,16 who also believe that the issue remains
unresolved.
7.4 Biometric sensors
As we explained in Sect. 5.2, there exist around 25 different
sensors on mobile platforms. They include communicational
sensors such as WiFi, environmental sensors such as ambient
light, movement sensors such as motion and orientation, and
biometric sensors such as Fingerprint. Here we specifically
13 http://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=421691.
14 http://mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2016-43/.
15 http://support.apple.com/en-gb/HT206166.
16 http://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=523320.
discuss biometric sensors since they are highly related to the
individuals’ identity.
After decades of working on password, it seems that peo-
ple still cannot remember strong passwords. Biometrics have
been offered to users as an effective authentication mecha-
nism. Examples include TouchID and Fingerprint sensors on
iOS and Android devices, respectively. But the biometric-
based authentication is not limited to mobile devices only. For
example, when paying with iPhone contactlessly, you need
to rest your finger on TouchID and hold your iPhone in close
proximity to the contactless reader until the task is finished.
Furthermore, since many banks have already moved their ser-
vices to mobile platforms, they benefit from the biometrics
sensors available on mobile devices, say for implementing 2-
factor authentication. As an example, in addition to user name
and passwords, HSBC authenticates their customers through
TouchID17 and voice ID.18 Another example is Smile to Pay
facial recognition app19 where deep learning is applied to
overcome the difficulty of face authentication when the face
photograph is not in the normal form. Recently Yahoo has
also introduced its ear-based smartphone identification sys-
tem.20
On the other hand, our findings show that mobile users
are relatively concerned with identity-related or biometric
sensors. However, we discussed that these sensors are not
necessarily the most risky ones to PINs in practice. As we
mentioned earlier, we believe that this might be the influence
of a more general risk model that the users have on mobile
technology. We believe that this is an important research topic
and requires further studies.
7.5 Limitations
We consider this work a pilot study that explores user risk
perception on a comprehensive list of mobile sensors. We
envisage the following future work to address these limita-
tions and expand this work:
• More Participants We performed our user studies on a set
of users who were recruited from a wide range of back-
grounds. Yet the number of the participants is limited. A
larger set of participants will improve the confidence in
the results. With a large and diverse set of participants,
we can also study the effect of demographic factors on
perceived risk.
17 http://us.hsbc.com/1/2/home/personal-banking/pib/mobile/
touchid.
18 http://hsbc.co.uk/1/2/contact-and-support/banking-made-easy/
voice-id.
19 http://brandchannel.com/2015/03/16/alibaba-demos-smile-to-pay
-facial-recognition-app/.
20 http://bbc.co.uk/news/technology-32498222.
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• Other Risks We studied the perceived risk on PINs as a
serious and immediate risk to users’ security. The study
can be expanded by studying users’ risk perception on
other issues such as attackers discovering phone call tim-
ing, physical activities, or shopping habits.
• Other Types of Access When interviewing our partici-
pants, we presented them with a scenario involving a
game app which is installed on their smartphone. This
only covers the in-app access to sensors. However, peo-
ple might express different risk levels for other types of
access, e.g. in-browser access. This needs further inves-
tigation.
• Issues with Training Users We decided to provide our
participants with a short description of each sensor’s
functionality (details in “Appendix 2”, part 3). Further-
more, the participants were given the chance to ask as
many questions as they wanted to fully understand the
functionality of each sensor. This might not be the most
effective way to inform users about sensors since some
descriptions might seem too technical (and hence not
fully understandable) to some users. How to inform users
in an effective way is a complex topic of research which
can be explored in the future.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced PINlogger.js, a web-based pro-
gram which reveals users’ PINs by recording the mobile
device’s orientation and motion sensor data through JavaScript
code. Access to mobile sensor data via JavaScript is limited to
only a few sensors at the moment. This will probably expand
in the future, specially with the rapid development of sensor-
enabled devices in the Internet of things (IoT).
We also showed that users do not generally perceive a
high risk about such sensors being able to steal their PINs.
Furthermore, we showed that people are not even gener-
ally knowledgeable about these sensors on mobile devices.
Accordingly, we discussed the complexity of designing a
usable and secure solution to prevent the proposed attacks.
Hence, designing a general mechanism for secure and usable
sensor data management remains a crucial open problem for
future research.
Many of the suggested academic solutions either have
not been applied by the industry as a practical solution, or
have failed. Given the results in our user studies, design-
ing a practical solution for this problem does not seem to
be straightforward. A combination of different approaches
might help researchers devise a usable and secure solution.
Having control on granting access before opening a web-
site and during working with it, in combination with a smart
notification feature in the browser would probably achieve
a balance between security and usability. Users should also
have control on reviewing, updating and deleting these data,
if stored by the website or shared with a third party after-
wards. Solutions such as Taintroid [35], a tracking app for
monitoring sources of sensitive data on a mobile which has
been applied for GPS in [29], could be helpful. After all, it
seems that an extensive study is required towards designing
a permission framework which is usable and secure at the
same time. Such research is a very important usable security
and privacy topic to be explored further in the future.
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Appendix 1: Call for participation flyer and partic-
ipant demographics
In this section, we present the participants demographics in
details and the flyers that we used for call for participation
of our user studies (Fig. 8; Table 7).
Appendix 2: Interview script
Hi. Thanks very much for contributing to our study. In this
interview, we will ask you to fill in a few questionnaires
about mobile sensors such as GPS, camera, light, motion,
and orientation. You are encouraged to think out loud as you
go through, and please feel free to provide any comments
during the interview. There is no right or wrong answer, and
our purpose is to evaluate the mobile sensors, not you. Every-
thing about this interview is anonymous. Please provide some
information about yourself in Table 8.
Part one
A list of multiple mobile sensors is presented below. To what
extent do you know each sensor on a mobile device? Please
rate them in the table (Table 9 was used).
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Fig. 8 Sample of flyer distributed for participant recruitment
Table 7 Participants’ self-reported demographics in the two studies, (y) indicates the years of owning a smartphone
Sex Age Job/Background Mobile (y) Sex Age Job/Background Mobile (y)
f 23 Civil Eng. Nokia (0) f 27 Teacher HTC(3)
f 28 Customer Support HTC (2) m 30 Services iPhone (4)
f 22 Media Sony (3) m 26 Computer Samsung (7)
m 43 IT iPhone (9) m 30 Teacher Blackberry (7)
f 27 Media iPhone (9) m 52 Nanotechnology Nokia (0)
m 18 Mathematics Samsung (3) m 41 Nanotechnology HTC (10)
f 30 Management iPhone (7) m 47 Lecturer Samsung (2)
m 22 Medical iPhone (10) f 39 Physics iPhone (4)
f 27 Human Mgmt. Huawei (9) f 31 Biology Samsung (10)
f 21 Literature Samsung (4) m 39 Student iPhone (6)
m 35 Media Samsung (6) f 30 Civil Eng. iPhone (5)
f 20 Languages Samsung (3) m 20 Student Samsung (4)
f 59 Services iPhone (3) f 52 Admin Samsung (3)
m 40 IT LG (7) f 30 Admin Samsung (5)
m 21 Biomedical Samsung (4) f 58 Admin iPhone (12)
f 22 Biomedical OnePlus (6) f 44 Admin Samsung (3)
m 30 Civil Eng. Samsung (3) f 27 Student Motorola (5)
m 29 Geodesy Samsung (7) f 47 Services iPhone (5)
m 28 Medical Sony (5) m 67 Teacher Nokia (0)
f 38 Computer Samsung (5) m 23 Student Nexus (5)
f 30 Animation iPhone (9) m 46 Cable Maker iPhone (5)
f 56 Business Mgmt. iPhone (11) m 35 Services Samsung (5)
f 29 Admin Samsung (5) f 39 Admin iPhone(5)
f 30 Admin Samsung (6) f 24 Student Gionee (3)
m 47 Driving Instructor Sony (11) f 34 Education iPhone (4)
f 28 Admin Motorola (7) m 32 Student OnePlus (6)
m 40 Education LG (5) f 37 Researcher Honor (3)
m 32 Computer iPhone (6) m 33 Industrial Mgmt. iPhone(12)
f 25 Law HTC (3) f 33 Mathematics Samsung (3)
m 30 Student Nexus (5) m 27 Student iPhone (18)
Part two
Imagine that you own a smartphone which is equipped
with all these sensors. Consider this scenario: you have
opened a game app which can have access to all mobile
sensors. You leave the game app open in the background,
and open your banking app which requires you to enter your
PIN.
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Table 8 Demography
Age
Gender
Profession/ background (optional)
1st language (optional)
Mobile device
Duration of owning a smartphone/tablet
Do you think any of these sensors can help the game app
discover your entered PIN? To what extent are you concerned
about each sensor’s risk to your PIN? Please rate them in the
table (Table 10 was used). In this section, please only rely on
the knowledge you already have about the sensors, and if you
do not know some of them, describe your feeling of security
about them.
Part three
Let us explain each sensor here:
• GPS: identifies the real-world geographic location.
• Camera, Microphone: capture pictures/videos and voice,
respectively.
• Fingerprint, TouchID: scans the fingerprint.
• Touch Screen: enables the user to interact directly with
the display by physically touching it.
• WiFi: is a wireless technology that allows the device to
connect to a network.
• Bluetooth: is a wireless technology for exchanging data
over short distances.
• Near-Field Communication (NFC): is a wireless technol-
ogy for exchanging data over shorter distances (less than
10 cm) for purposes such as contactless payment.
• Proximity: measures the distance of objects from the
touch screen.
• Ambient Light: measures the light level in the environ-
ment of the device.
• Ambient Pressure (Barometer), Ambient Humidity, and
Ambient Temperature: measure the air pressure, humid-
Table 9 This form was used for part one
Sensor I’ve never I’ve heard I know what I know I know
heard of this of this but I this is but I generally very well
don’t know don’t know how this how this
what this is how this works works works
Bluetooth
Gyroscope
GPS
Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature
Accelerometer
Magnetic Field
Motion
Fingerprint
Orientation
Proximity
Ambient Pressure
Hall Sensor
Rotation
Touch Screen
Camera
TouchID
Barometer
Gravity
Microphone
Ambient Humidity
WiFi
Ambient Light
NFC
Device Temperature
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Table 10 This form was used for parts two and three
Risk to PIN
Not A little Moderately Extremely
Sensor Concerned Concerned Concerned Concerned Concerned
Bluetooth
Gyroscope
GPS
Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature
Accelerometer
Magnetic Field
Motion
Fingerprint
Orientation
Proximity
Ambient Pressure
Hall Sensor
Rotation
Touch Screen
Camera
TouchID
Barometer
Gravity
Microphone
Ambient Humidity
WiFi
Ambient Light
NFC
Device Temperature
ity, and temperature in the environment of the device,
respectively.
• Device Temperature: measures the temperature of the
device.
• Gravity: measures the force of gravity.
• Magnetic Field: reports the ambient magnetic field inten-
sity around the device.
• Hall sensor: produces voltage based on the magnetic
field.
• Accelerometer: measures the acceleration of the device
movement or vibration.
• Rotation: reports how much and in what direction the
device is rotated.
• Gyroscope: estimates the rotation rate of the device.
• Motion: measures the acceleration and the rotation of the
device.
• Orientation: reports the physical angle that the device is
held in.
• Sensor Hub: is an activity recognition sensor and its pur-
pose is to monitor the device’s movement.
Please feel free to ask us about any of these sensors for more
information.
Now that you have more knowledge about the sensors, let
us describe the same scenario here again. Imagine that you
own a smartphone which is equipped with all these sensors.
You have opened a game app which can have access to all
mobile sensors. You leave the game app open in the back-
ground, and open your banking app which requires you to
enter your PIN.
Do you think any of these sensors can help the game app to
discover your entered PIN? To what extent are you concerned
about each sensor’s risk to your PIN? Please rate them in
the table (Table 10 was used). In this part, please make sure
that you know the functionality of all the sensors. If you are
unsure, please have another look at the descriptions, or ask
us about them.
Thanks very much for taking part in this study. Please
leave any extra comment here.
An Amazon voucher and a business card are in this
envelope. Please contact us if you have any questions
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about this interview, or are interested in the results of this
study.
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